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Introduction
This presentation deals with contracts entered into by a person suffering from 
mental incapacity, in the context of Italian, French and English law as well as 
the new Proposal for a Common European Sales Law.
We will discuss this through four key points. 
First, we will provide an overview of the rules of invalidity linked to men-
tal incapacity of one contracting party in the three legal systems and their 
general features.
Second, we will consider in greater depth the invalidity conditions under 
Italian, French and English law.
Third, we analyze the limits of the rule: both the lower limit, given by eve-
ryday life contracts, and the upper ones, regarding whether an absolute mental 
incapacity can lead to a different kind of invalidity and the special rule given 
under Italian law in the context of gifts.
Finally, the fourth part deals with mental incapacity in the light of the broad-
er framework of ‘bargaining power abuse’, also considered by the new Proposal 
for a Common European Sales Law.
1. Outline: Invalidity of the contract for mental incapacity
We are now going to consider the first point, i.e. an overview of the consequenc-
es linked to contract entered into by a person who lacks capacity.
Generally speaking, under Italian, English and French law a contract entered 
into by a person suffering from mental incapacity is invalid, provided that cer-
tain conditions are met.
Whilst the examined legal systems refer to such invalidity using different 
terminology and approaches (with the civil law systems seeing such invalidity 
as the rule and common law referring to it as an exception), the kinds of invalid-
ity provided share a number of common features. 
Specifically, the aim of the invalidity rule is to protect the person of unsound 
mind. This is why only the person considered incapable is allowed to exercise 
the rights associated with the status. 
Moreover, a distinction can be drawn between a general and a special regime 
of invalidity of the contract, depending on whether the person is subject to any 
protective measure (though in the common law such distinction is not express-
ly drawn by doctrine).
In Italy this issue is regulated by article 428 of the codice civile (entitled “Acts 
made by a mentally disordered person”), the second and third paragraph of ar-
ticle 427, which deal with situations where the person is subject to a protective 
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measure and someone else should have acted on his behalf or assisted him, and 
article 412 which addresses the case of ‘amministrazione di sostegno’1.
Under French law, the relevant provisions are found in the code civil with ar-
ticle 414-1 setting a general regime, and special rules being provided by articles 
435, from 464 to 466 and 4882.
In contrast to the aforesaid systems, in the United Kingdom the matter is al-
most entirely regulated by case law. The only relevant statutory provision is sec-
tion 7 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The most relevant precedents are found 
in: in re Walker (1904); Imperial Loan Company Ltd v Stone (1892) and Hart v 
O’Connor (1985)3.
2. Italian, French and English law: 
Person’s competency not limited by any protective measure
If we now turn to the second point and consider the conditions for such inva-
lidity under Italian, French and English law, we firstly have to say that each of 
the legal systems under consideration provides a different regime regarding the 
conditions for contractual invalidity depending on whether the person is subject 
to a protective measure or not. In other words, different provisions apply for le-
gal incompetency (incapacità legale in Italy, incapacité légal in France) and mental 
incapacity (incapacità naturale in Italy; insanité d’esprit in France).
First considering the general case, i.e. the case where the person’s competency 
has not been limited by any protective measure but he was non compos mentis at 
the moment the contract was concluded, we observe two approaches. 
On the one hand, Italian and English law establish that the contract is void-
able at the insane person’s will on the condition that the other party was aware of 
his mental impairment at the time of the contract.
Conversely, under French law the contract can be declared void at the request 
of the mentally incapable person without the need of any further requirement 
but the proof of the mental incapacity. The other party’s awareness is therefore 
irrelevant for the determination of invalidity of the contract. 
The Italian courts have interpreted the second paragraph of Article 428 of the 
Italian codice civile as allowing the mentally incapable party to avoid the contract 
1 For an overview, see Pescara, Tecniche privatistiche e istituti di salvaguardia dei disabili psichici, in 
Trattato di diritto privato Rescigno, III, 4, 2nd edn, Utet, Torino, 1997, 839 ff.; PietroBon, Incapacità 
naturale, in Enciclopedia giuridica, XVIII, Treccani, Roma, 1989.
2 duBois-PaiLLet, «Incapable Majeurs», in Encyclopédie Juridique Dalloz, Repertoire de droit civil, VI, 
Dalloz, France, mise a jour 2012; starck-roLand-Boyer, Droit civil. Les obligations, 2. Contrat, 16th edn, 
Litec, Paris, 1998, 157 ff.
3 In re Walker [1905] 1 Ch 160; Imperial Loan Company Ltd v Stone [1892] 1 Q.B. 599; Hart v O’Connor 
[1985] 1 A.C. 1000.
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on the basis of his mental impairment if the other party was in bad faith, which 
generally consists in the knowledge of the party’s incapacity. However, it has to 
be said that the interpretation of the article has been a matter of considerable de-
bate. In fact, if we read the first paragraph of article 428 codice civile, it refers to the 
discipline of acts made by a mentally incapable person and provides that the act 
can be avoided if it causes a prejudice to the mentally impaired party. Now, if we 
remember that a contract is in the first instance an act, we could argue that a con-
tract can be avoided only if both conditions (bad faith and a prejudice suffered 
by the incapable person) are met. Such argument is supported by a large part of 
the doctrine, whilst on the contrary jurisprudence does not require the existence 
of any prejudice.
Similarly, under English law a contract entered into by a person suffering 
from mental incapacity is voidable if the other party was aware of his lack of 
capacity at the moment the contract was concluded. The rule was issued in Im-
perial Loan Company Ltd v Stone (1892)4. Besides, voidability does not depend 
upon a prejudice suffered by the party, understood as unfairness of the bargain, 
as shown in Hart v O’Connor (1985). Lastly, at English law a contract is also void-
able if any reasonable man would have realized that the person was incapable, 
which is argued against by Italian authors.
Both Italian and English law try to find a balance between the protection of 
the person of unsound mind and the protection of the other party’s reliance on 
the contract. In particular, the reason for the bad faith requirement for avoidance 
is to safeguard the sane party reliance on the contract.
On the other hand, French law does not afford similar protection to the other 
party’s reliance on the contract and is more favorable to the mentally incapable 
person. In fact, article 414-1 code civil does not require that the other party be 
aware of the incapacity for declaring the contract ‘nul’ (that means void). Instead, 
the proof of mental insanity is sufficient. Despite the term used to refer to such 
invalidity, which is ‘nullité’ and could be translated with ‘voidness’, the kind of 
invalidity provided by French law is similar to Italian voidability.
The same favor to the incapable can be seen as the basis of a further rule. In 
the French legal system a contract (and, more generally, an act) entered into by 
a person during the two years preceding the commencement of proceedings for 
subjecting that person to a protective measure can be declared void just if he 
proves that he was unable to defend his own interests and he suffered a prejudice 
from the act (article 462 code civil).
This framework raises the question as to how one deals with cases where the 
mental incapacity is not easily recognizable by the other party. 
This could occur in at least two situations. 
4 For English law, see Treitel’s The Law of Contract, 13th edn, Sweet&Maxwell, London, 2011, 586 
ff.; cLarke, Vitiating Factors, in Furmston (ed), The Law of Contract, 4th edn, Part of Butterworths 
Common Law Series, United Kingdom, 2010, 857 ff.; haLe, Mental Health Law, Sweet&Maxwell, 
London, 2010. 
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The first is when no symptom is easily perceptible - we can think about an old 
person who seems alert at first sight, but who actually suffers from Alzheimer 
and forgets events after a short time. 
A second potential scenario is when the contract is concluded without the 
physical presence of the parties, for example by means of the internet - for in-
stance a person suffering from a mental incapacity who buys some rare stamps 
on E-bay -. In such cases, under a domestic point of view, assuming an objective 
meaning of bad faith might be a helpful approach. The reference to a prejudice 
ensuing from the act to the incapable contained in the second paragraph of arti-
cle 428, could be considered sufficient to raise a presumption of bad faith thereby 
creating the possibility for avoiding the contract. To put it differently, a flexible 
application of statutory rules could lead to a better protection for the mental in-
capable. At English law, the courts’ concern with not interfering with the free-
dom of contract means that it is unlikely they would grant voidability of the con-
tract. On the contrary, in France the declaration of voidness simply requires the 
proof of the mental impairment, meaning that such questions do not arise and 
the mental insane will always be protected.
3. Italian, French and English law: 
judicial measure which limits the person’s capacity
Moving on to the second hypothesis, this is the case the court has found the 
person permanently insane and has consequently rendered a judicial measure 
which limits the person’s capacity to act for himself (in Italy the relevant legal 
institutes are interdizione, inabilitazione and amministrazione di sostegno; in France 
they are tutelle, curatelle and sauveguarde de justice; the United Kingdom does not 
have the same legal institutes, however section 16 of the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 provides that the court could make the decision on his behalf in relation to 
certain matters or appoint a ‘deputy’ to make decisions on the person’s behalf). In 
this context, all of the systems under consideration provide for a higher level of 
protection for the incapable person.
In particular, two issues are worth highlighting.
Firstly, since an evaluation of the person’s capacity to understand and act in 
accordance with his own interests is made ex ante by the court, invalidity is not 
subject to the verification of the lack of mental capacity in the specific case. A 
non-rebuttable legal presumption of fact applies (that means that the other party 
is not permitted to prove the contrary). 
Turning to the second point, the filing system provided by each legal system 
enables anyone to be aware of the judicial measure the incapable person is sub-
jected to. Therefore one could argue that the reliance the other party could have 
had on the contract does not deserve further protection since he has the possibil-
ity of taking knowledge of the incapacity. 
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In fact, the Italian codice civile provides that any act the incapable person 
makes without the necessary assistance or legal representation of the guardian 
(the so called ‘curatore’ in the first case and ‘tutore’ in the second one) is voidable 
without any need for effective knowledge of the party’s incapacity (article 427, 
second and third paragraph). 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom if the person’s property is subject to the 
control of the court, the contract through which he disposes of the property does 
not bind him, but binds the other party. However, it is unclear whether the rule 
extends also to contracts unrelated to the disposition of property.
The French system differs from the ones examined and is more complex. If a 
person is subject to sauvegarde de justice or other measure and he personally made 
an act he should have been legally represented for, the act is voidable (nullité rela-
tive, provided by articles 435, 465, n. 3 code civil). If the person should have been 
only assisted for acting, the contract can be avoided if a prejudice ensued from it 
to the incapable (article 465, n. 2 code civil). 
With regard to those acts for which the person subject to a protective meas-
ure retains capacity, the general rules seem to apply in each of the legal systems 
considered. 
However, the French system provides a more flexible regime. Such acts can 
still be avoided in virtue of the general rule of art. 414-1 code civil, but can other-
wise be “rescinded for overreaching on the ground of enormous disproportion 
between the prestations of the parties” or “reduced for excess” (art. 425, 465, n. 1 
code civil). In such cases the court must consider the usefulness of the act for the 
person, the other party’s good or bad faith and the importance or consistence of 
the insane person’s property.
4. Limits to the rule: Lower limit
After analyzing the conditions in which operates the invalidity rule, we have 
now to examine the third aspect, which concerns the lower and upper limits to 
the afore examined rules of invalidity.
The lower limit deals with everyday life contracts concluded by the person 
subject to a protective measure. These are referred to as ‘atti’ or ‘contratti’ ‘mini-
mi’ in Italy, ‘actes de la vie courant’ in France and ‘contracts for necessaries’ in the 
United Kingdom. The question is whether the regime of invalidity we have seen 
applies to such contracts, or, on the other hand, the need for securing necessary 
goods and services to the person of unsound mind justifies a different approach. 
Although Italian statutory law does not provide any special rule for the case, 
it is believed that the person subject to a protective measure retains a minimum 
freedom of contracting in relation to everyday life necessities. Therefore such 
contracts are to be considered valid, provided that they are not prejudicial (as the 
general rule provided by article 428 codice civile still applies).
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Similarly, in France the same approach has been supported by the authors in the 
absence of any statutory provision. Before 1968, the reason for the rule was found 
in the existence of an implied mandate in favor of the incapable person. Since then 
the courts have relied upon the analogic application of the code civil rules concern-
ing minors that grant a limited capacity in relation to everyday life acts.
Under English law, the rule applying to this kind of contracts has been set 
out in Statute. Namely, section 7 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides that if 
the contract refers to the supply of necessary goods and services, the person who 
lacks capacity to contract must pay a reasonable price for them. For this purpose, 
“‘necessary’ means suitable to a person’s condition in life and to his actual re-
quirements at the time when the goods or services are supplied”. In other words, 
in such cases, even if it is not directly stated that the contract is valid, the law 
allows the supplier a remedy at common law for recovering a reasonable price. 
In brief, the aim of these rules is to find a balance between the interests of the 
mentally impaired to secure necessary goods and services at fair terms - avoiding 
the risk of social exclusion and exploitation -, and the interest of the other party 
to enter into valid contracts, - avoiding the risk of precariousness of the effects -, 
or at least to obtain payment. 
5. Limits to the rule: Upper limits
Moving on to the upper limits, two aspects have to be considered.
Firstly, it has to be examined whether an absolute lack of mental capacity ex-
cludes the existence of an effective consent and therefore leads to voidness / nulli-
ty of the contract (rather than voidability) for lack of one of its essential elements.
The aforesaid argument used to be supported in the past but appears to have 
lost its persuasiveness as of recent. 
In France, until the 1968 reform, authors referred to mental incapacity as an 
element excluding effective consent, required by article 1108 code civil for the va-
lidity of the contract. 
In Italy the argument had some followers under the previous codice civile 
1865, whilst since then it has been generally accepted that article 428 codice civile 
has set an organic discipline (only isolated authors still argue that the contract 
entered into by a person in state of absolute lack of mental capacity is void for 
defect of consent).
Secondly, special rules are provided by Italian and English law for gifts, there-
fore the general rule requiring proof of the other party’s awareness for avoiding 
the contract does not apply to such contracts (anyway, it has to be said, gift is not 
a contract according to English law). Instead, a gift is voidable to the mentally in-
capable donor choice if he only gives proof of his mental impairment. The reason 
for such rule is clear: the reliance of the donee can be sacrificed in favor to the 
mentally disordered donor interests according to the gratuity of gift.
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6. Incapacity and the CESL: Lack of any specific rule
One last point has to be tackled: the one concerning the broader framework 
where incapacity has to be seen. 
A comparative analysis of the subject “mental capacity and contract” is cer-
tainly useful in any case that presents elements of extraneousness, which is be-
coming more and more frequent as a result of increased mobility and of weaken-
ing of the connection between trade and national territory.
Where an element of extraneousness exists international private law rules ap-
ply: namely, with reference to domestic law, article 13 of Regulation Rome I (n° 
593/2008) on the law applicable to contractual obligations, and the second para-
graph of article 23 of Italian law n° 218/1995 on the reform of Italian interna-
tional private law indicates which law to apply in case of one party’s incapacity.
However, comparison is not sufficient for an exhaustive analysis of the topic 
of mental incapacity and contract. In fact, it cannot fail to consider the broader 
dimension, in which the phenomenon has to be framed namely European law.
In particular, although mental incapacity stands out from its object, it is use-
ful to refer to the new proposal for a regulation on a Common European Sales 
Law, dated October 2011, which was born from the revision of the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference and provides an optional regime for sale contracts.
The choice for excluding specific rules about mental incapacity from the pro-
posal (also expressed in recital n° 27 of the proposal) is consistent with the tra-
ditional European and international policy as well as with soft law instruments. 
Namely, an identical exclusion is made, among others, by Convention of 1968 on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
and Regulation Bruxelles I (n° 2001/44/EC) on the same matter and by the PECL 
(Principles of European Contract Law, art. 4:101) and the Unidroit Principles 
(edition 2010: chapter 3, art. 3.1.1.) as soft law instruments. 
Two reasons could explain this exclusion. 
The first is the subsidiarity and proportionality principles that guide the 
European Union’s intervention.
The second reason relates to the Regulation’s objective matter, the means con-
tracts are more frequently concluded by and the nature of the parties. In fact, 
the proposed regulation does not only consider natural persons but also small 
and medium sized enterprises, to which no question of mental incapacity arises. 
Moreover, the regulation covers cross-border contracts. This implies that the 
more frequent hypothesis will be the one where the purchase is concluded with-
out the physical presence of the parties, thus it is unlikely that one of them will 
be aware of the mental incapacity of the other. Finally, as regards contracts whose 
parties are a trader and a consumer, the lower limit of the invalidity rule could 
come into consideration; in fact, those contracts would normally provide for 
everyday life needs.
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7. CESL and unfair exploitation
However, although mental incapacity is not considered by the Proposal for a 
Common Sales Law, the interests of someone who is mentally impaired could be 
protected in two different ways.
Firstly, remedies provided for consumer contracts apply if the impaired per-
son acts as a consumer, and not as an entrepreneur. Specifically, in the case where 
the contract is concluded without the physical presence of the parties provisions 
for distance contracts could apply. That means that the consumer who is men-
tally impaired could exercise the right of withdrawal provided by each Member 
State's statutory law after directive 97/7/EC, which was recently amended by di-
rective 2011/83 on consumer rights (and to which Member States should comply 
with by December 2013).
Secondly, a wider provision could absorb the importance of mental capacity 
provisions. Namely Article 51 of the proposal, which regulates unfair exploita-
tion, a legal institute linked to the bargaining power abuse of one party to the 
detriment of the other. 
The rule provides that a party may avoid a contract if two conditions are met 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract: “(a) that party was dependent on, or 
had a relationship of trust with, the other party, was in economic distress or had 
urgent needs, was improvident, ignorant, or inexperienced; and (b) the other 
party knew or could be expected to have known this and, in the light of the cir-
cumstances and purpose of the contract, exploited the first party’s situation by 
taking an excessive benefit or unfair advantage.”
Avoidance can be reached extra-judicially, by giving notice of it to the other 
party (according to Article 52) within one year from when the party becomes 
aware of the relevant circumstances or becomes capable of acting freely. The 
mechanism was already provided for by the Unidroit Principles (article 3.2.11), 
but it remains unknown to domestic law.
From an internal point of view, the rule on unfair exploitation has some fea-
tures in common with rescission for overreaching on the ground of enormous 
disproportion between the parties’ performances (art. 1448 codice civile). How-
ever, while the latter requires a certain disproportion between performances, 
unfair exploitation rescinds from it: the attribution of an unfair advantage is 
substantially sufficient for presuming the agreement to be harmful for the inca-
pable person or, in any case, for rebalancing contractual positions by providing 
the mentally impaired the right to avoid the contract.
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8. Final remarks
In conclusion, it appears that special rules on mental incapacity could lose a great 
deal of their importance in the light of the attention paid by the new instruments 
to bargaining power abuse. 
This will be especially true in each case the person of unsound mind would be 
able to make use of easier accessible remedies provided for situations of contrac-
tual power inferiority.
In other terms, the system resulting from the new provisions will be more 
complex and flexible and will lead to the overcoming of the traditional distinc-
tion between capacity and incapacity, this means that protection would be also 
granted to persons suffering from modest incapacity and undergoing abuse. 
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